> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://tonify-1.gitbook.io/tonify-docs/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://tonify-1.gitbook.io/tonify-docs/simulations/sim6.md).

# sim6 — discovery floor

Direct + guaranteed discovery floor — kill the zero atom without turning Tonify back into a streaming pool.

**The question.** L4 says the problem for small artists is the zero atom, not the mean and not $k$. How much does it cost to remove that lottery without turning the product back into an ordinary streaming pool?

**The gates.** World anchors T1–T3; $q\_{\mathrm{eligible}}=0$ at $B>0$; floor sums to $B$; the direct term is untouched; at $\beta<1$ the floor's top share is lighter than $D$'s; MVA at $B=0$ matches pure direct.

**The headline.** The atom is an eligibility cost. A living wage is a $B$ cost. Any $B>0$ yields $q\_{\mathrm{eligible}}=0$. Among artists with $A\_i>0$, pure direct is 77.7% zeros; $A\_{\min}=1$ kills the atom, $A\_{\min}\le3$ leaves at most half. At 5% of the independent pool, $A\_{\min}=10$, the mean floor is $16.38/year and hybrid MVA is 3 110 against pure direct 3 204.

**Run it.** `python3 sim6/floor.py`.

***

### sim6 — Direct + guaranteed discovery floor

Not a fourth pure mechanism and not sold as direct. L4 says the problem for small artists is the zero atom, not the mean and not $k$. The operator that attacks the atom keeps fan money direct and adds a platform discovery pool $B$ for artists with verified audience $A\_i\ge A\_{\min}$, weighted $A\_i^\beta$ with $\beta<1$.

![fig21\_floor\_zeros](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ProximaCA/tonify-sims/main/figures/fig21_floor_zeros.png)

*fig21 — share of artists with $Y=0$ against the eligibility threshold $A\_{\min}$ ($B/R=5%$, $\beta=0.5$, sim1 world N=200,000, seed 42). Eligible artists sit at zero; the remaining atom is whoever missed the threshold and lost the $D$ lottery.*

**Finding 13 — the atom is an eligibility cost; a living wage is a $B$ cost.** Any $B>0$ yields $q\_{\mathrm{eligible}}=0$. Among artists with $A\_i>0$ (everyone in this world) pure direct is 77.7% zeros; $A\_{\min}=1$ kills that atom entirely, $A\_{\min}=3$ leaves 37.2% (≤50%), $A\_{\min}=2$ leaves 27.9%. $B/R$ does not bind the atom. At $A\_{\min}=10$, $B=0.05R$ is $1,118,570$ spread over 68,271 eligible artists — **$16.38**/year mean floor. Hybrid MVA moves 3,204 → 3,110 against independent-pool 12,771 and signed-pool 188,590. The lottery is gone; the wage is not. Signed hybrid MVA equals independent: $B$ and $D$ do not pass through $\rho$ ([sim6](https://github.com/ProximaCA/tonify-sims/blob/main/sim6/SPEC.md)).

![fig22\_floor\_mva](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ProximaCA/tonify-sims/main/figures/fig22_floor_mva.png)

*fig22 — hybrid MVA against $B/R$ ($A\_{\min}=10$, $\beta=0.5$). Yellow: independent pool 12,771; pink: signed 188,590; cyan: pure direct 3,204. The floor barely moves MVA because $B$ is smeared across every eligible artist.*

**Finding 14 — the floor changes the bottom, not the top; fake uniques at the threshold are the fraud that bites.** At $\beta=0.5$ the top 0.28% take 11.4% of the floor against 44.5% of $D$; at $\beta=1$ the floor copies $D$'s tail (44.6%). 50,000 one-contact fakes steal 2.5% of $B$; the same farm at $A\_{\min}=30$ steals 14.3%. $A\_{\min}$ is not an anti-fraud defense by itself: it moves the incentive from minting many one-shot identities to producing convincing threshold audiences. Each fake is dearer, but the honest eligible set has shrunk.


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